Protecting Cryptography Against Compelled Self-Incrimination

Abstract

The information security community has devoted substantial effort to the design, development, and universal deployment of strong encryption schemes that withstand search and seizure by computationally-powerful nation-state adversaries. In response, governments are increasingly turning to a different tactic: issuing a subpoena that compels a person to decrypt a device themselves, under the penalty of contempt of court if she does not comply. These compelled decryption subpoenas sidestep questions around government search powers that have dominated the Crypto Wars and instead touch upon a different, and still unsettled, area of the law: how encryption relates to a person’s right against self-incrimination. In this talk, I will describe the state of law surrounding compelled decryption and offer a scientific framework in which to reason about this threat.

This is joint work with Sarah Scheffler.