Controlled Side Channel Attacks on Haven by a Trusted Operating System

Speaker/Bio

Kyle Hogan is an undergraduate at Boston University.

Abstract

Haven seeks to leverage Intel SGX and Microsoft Drawbridge to provide a shielded environment for the execution of unmodified legacy applications in the cloud. It assumes a mutual distrust between cloud provider and tenant with the intention of providing clients with the security of a private cloud on publicly owned hardware. However, it fails to account for side channel attacks, in particular those that could be performed by a malicious host operating system. The attack on Haven presented here uses an offline analysis of memory access patterns of the application binary to be run within Haven\x92s enclave coupled with the host operating system\x92s ability to manage page faults to construct a trace of the application\x92s page accesses. An offline analysis of this trace allows the attacker to recover text documents and images from within Haven after a single run of the application.